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INTRODUCTION

A

review of Texas Supreme Court mandamus decisions demonstrates an apparent increase in the uses of this extraordinary
.
remedy to direct trial court actions. The Texas Supreme Court
also continues to streamline appellate procedure by refusing, whenever
possible, to decide cases on procedural technicalities. In this Survey period, for example, it did so in the areas of objecting to the jury to charge,'
assuring a complete record, 2 and briefing points of error. 3
-

1. Texas Dep't of Human Serv. v. Hinds, 904 S.W.2d 629 (Tex. 1995).
2. Silk v. Terrill, 898 S.W.2d 764 (Tex. 1995) (per curiam).
3. Anderson v. Gilbert, 897 S.W.2d 783 (Tex. 1995) (per curiam).
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II. APPELLATE REVIEW BEFORE FINAL JUDGMENT
A.

1.

MANDAMUS

Time Frame for Filing Mandamus

No rule of procedure sets a deadline for filing a mandamus challenge to
a trial court's order, but the extraordinary nature of the relief requested
requires prompt action. In Stafford v. O'Neill,4 the court of appeals held
that an appellant, seeking mandamus relief from an order sustaining a
contest to his affidavit of inability to pay costs, filed his mandamus too
late when he waited more than two months after the court sustained the
contest before seeking mandamus relief from the order.5
2. Denial of Mandamus Relief

a. Order selecting limited number of plaintiffs for initial separate
trial in multi-plaintiff lawsuit
In Polaris Inv. Management Corp. v. Abascal,6 a case involving 2700
plaintiffs, the trial court ordered that the claims of a small group of the
plaintiffs proceed in an initial separate trial. The defendants sought a writ
of mandamus to correct the trial court's order, but the supreme court
denied their petition, holding, "even if the trial judge erroneously selected the trial plaintiffs, mandamus relief is still inappropriate. ' 7 According to the court, the selection of trial plaintiffs is an "incidental
ruling," inappropriate for review by mandamus.8 Granting mandamus relief under these facts, the court concluded, would "severely impair the
ability of trial judges to manage their dockets, and would require this
Court to micromanage trials."9
The supreme court similarly denied the defendants' petition for writ of
mandamus to correct the trial court's order limiting discovery to those
plaintiffs selected in the initial separate trial in Polaris.'0 The court held
that the trial judge's decision to restrict discovery in this manner was not
of such an "egregious nature that it goes to the heart of [defendants']
case," and hence mandamus was improper." The court again noted that
the order was a ruling incidental to the trial process that would not deprive defendants of substantial rights.' 2 The court also reaffirmed that
venue determinations are not reviewable by mandamus. 13
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
1990)).

902 S.W.2d 67 (Tex. App.-Houston [lst Dist.] 1995, original proceeding).
Id. at 68.
892 S.W.2d 860 (Tex. 1995) (original proceeding).
Id. at 861.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 861-62.
Polaris, 892 S.W.2d at 862.
Id.
Id. (citing Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc. v. Walker, 787 S.W.2d 954, 955 (Tex.
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Order denying plea in abatement

The San Antonio Court of Appeals in Coastal Oil & Gas Corp. v. Flores, 14 held that although the trial court should have granted a plea in
abatement, because a lawsuit filed in Zapata County was inherently interrelated to a previously filed suit in Dallas County, the court of appeals
could not grant relators' petition for writ of mandamus because the
supreme court has instructed that the refusal to abate is "an incidental
ruling for which the relators have an adequate remedy by appeal."' 15
The court of appeals observed, paradoxically, that even though it was
not authorized to mandate the abatement of the Zapata County action, it
was authorized to issue writs of mandamus to correct errors in discovery
matters that may arise during the pendency of the Zapata County action
where the applicant has no adequate remedy by appeal. 16 Thus, it would
be forced to review a discovery ruling in a case that should have been
abated and consequently forced to engage in a "wasteful expenditure of
judicial resources."'1 7 The court counseled refiling of the plea in abatement to permit the trial court to reconsider its ruling in light of the court
8
of appeals' comments.'
In Hall v. Lawlis,' 9 the supreme court confirmed again the general rule
that mandamus will not issue to correct an erroneous refusal to grant a
plea in abatement. In Lawlis, two lawsuits involving the same parties
were filed, the first in Harris County and the second in Jasper County.
The defendants in the Jasper County lawsuit moved to have the lawsuit
abated or dismissed on the basis that the Harris County court had acquired dominant jurisdiction. 20 While the motion to abate was pending,
the Jasper County trial court granted a motion to compel the production
of documents filed by the plaintiffs. The trial court overruled the motion
2
to abate. '
The supreme court refused to review the ruling by mandamus, stating
that in Abor v. Black, the court had "decided that it would not review by
mandamus the refusal of a trial court to abate an action based on the
pendency of another action unless the courts were directly interfering
with each other by issuing conflicting orders or injunctions." 22 Since the
Harris County and Jasper County courts were not directly interfering
with each other, the supreme court concluded mandamus was not
14. 908 S.W.2d 517 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1995, orig. proceeding).
15. Id. at 518 (citing Abor v. Black, 695 S.W.2d 564 (Tex. 1985)). The lawsuits both
concerned "the proper method of calculation and payment of royalties under the same
mineral leases, covering the same land, and relating to the same production of gas from the
same units and wells." Id.
16. Id. at 519.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. 907 S.W.2d 493, 494 (Tex. 1995) (orig. proceeding).
20. Id. at 494.
21. Id.
22. Id. (citing Abor, 695 S.W.2d at 567).
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appropriate. 23
c.

Order denying petition in intervention

In Segovia-Slape v. Paxson,24 the relator, the aunt of two children
whose parents had filed for divorce, filed a petition in intervention in the
divorce action seeking custody of the children. The judge refused to allow the aunt to intervene, stating he "never lets anyone intervene in di'25
vorce matters.
While not approving the trial court's policy precluding all interventions
in divorce matters, the court of appeals held, "the right to intervene is
subject to the court's wide discretion," and on the facts of the case before
it, the court could not conclude the trial court clearly abused its discretion
26
in striking the petition in intervention.
3. Grant of Mandamus Relief
a. Order overruling special appearance
The Texas Supreme Court analyzed the availability of mandamus to
correct a trial court's denial of a special appearance in National Industrial
Sand Ass'n v. Gibson.27 In Gibson the court applied the rule from Canadian Helicopters Ltd. v. Wittig28 that although "an appeal from a final
judgment is ordinarily adequate to remedy denial of a special appearance" an exception to this rule exists "in cases in which the trial court's
assertion of personal jurisdiction is 'with such disregard for guiding principles of law that the harm to the defendant becomes irreparable."' 29 The
court held that the order in Gibson fell within the exception "[b]ecause
the traditional elements of personal jurisdiction were totally absent in the
30
case."

Four justices dissented, concluding the defendants would have an adequate remedy by ordinary appeal. 31 In fact, the defendants did not even
argue that an ordinary appeal would be an inadequate appellate remedy. 32 Noting that a showing of expense and delay is not enough to justify mandamus relief, the dissent emphasized that the court had recently
reaffirmed in Walker v. Packer that an inadequate appellate remedy is a
"fundamental tenet" of mandamus practice. 33 The dissent warned: "If
23. Id.
24. 893 S.W.2d 694 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1995, orig. proceeding).
25. Id. at 695-96.
26. Id. at 696; see Walker v. Packer, 827 S.W.2d 833 (Tex. 1992) (orig. proceeding).
27. 897 S.W.2d 769 (Tex. 1995) (orig. proceeding).
28. 876 S.W.2d 304 (Tex. 1994) (orig. proceeding).
29. Gibson, 897 S.W.2d at 771 (quoting Canadian Helicopters, 876 S.W.2d at 308).
30. Id. at 776 (noting that, unlike in Canadian Helicopters where the trial court was
faced with a voluminous record filled with contradictory evidence of "contacts" with the
forum state, the trial court here faced only the plaintiff's bare allegations of contacts).
31. Id. at 776-77 (Cornyn, J., dissenting) (joined by Chief Justice Phillips and Justices
Gammage and Enoch).
32. Id. at 777.
33. Id. (citing Walker, 827 S.W.2d at 842).
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the [c]ourt is free to ignore that tenet in this case, it may as well begin
'34
issuing extraordinary writs to correct denials of summary judgments.
b.

Order denying motion to compel interrogatory answer
In Able Supply Co. v. Moye,35 a mass products liability case with over
3,000 plaintiffs, the supreme court granted a writ of mandamus to correct
a trial court's refusal to compel an answer to an interrogatory. The plaintiffs in Able Supply alleged that while employed and working at a Lone
Star Steel plant, they were exposed to toxic materials delivered to the
plant at various times from 1947 to the present. In 1987, the defendants
directed a master set of interrogatories to the plaintiffs, asking the plaintiffs to state the name and address of every doctor who had attributed the
plaintiffs' alleged injuries to exposure to defendants' products.
The trial court required only 30 plaintiffs each month to respond to the
interrogatory, and at the time of the mandamus proceeding, only 800 of
the more than 3000 plaintiffs had filed answers. 36 Most of those responses stated that the answer to the interrogatory "has not been determined at this time, but will be supplemented at a later date. '37
The defendants filed a motion to compel in 1991, which the trial court
denied. The defendants tried again in 1993. Again, the trial court denied
the motion. The defendants then petitioned the supreme court for relief
from the trial court's refusal to compel an answer to the interrogatory. 38
The supreme court conditionally granted writ, holding that the trial
court could have properly reached only one conclusion: that the motion
to compel should be granted. 39 The motion to compel would have required the plaintiffs to answer an interrogatory linking their injuries with
a particular product and would simplify the case, streamline costs to all
parties, conserve judicial resources, and aid the lower court in preparing a
plan for trial of the cases. 40 The trial court's denial of the motion to com41
pel, therefore, constituted a clear abuse of discretion.
The supreme court observed that the defendants Able Supply fell into
one of the three situations the court had identified in Walker v. Packer, in
which a remedy by an appeal may be inadequate. 42 The situation exists,
the court held, when a trial court's discovery order "imposes a burden on
'43
[one party] far out of proportion to any benefit to the [other] party.
The court noted that the defendants had spent eight years and millions of
dollars defending against a lawsuit without access to the basic facts under34. Id.

35. 898 S.W.2d 766, 767 (Tex. 1995) (orig. proceeding).
36. Under the schedule set forth by the trial court, answers from the remainder would
have required an additional seven to eight years.
37. Id. at 768.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 771.

40. Id

41. Able Supply, 898 S.W.2d at 771.
42. Id. (citing Walker, 827 S.W.2d at 843).
43. Id.
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pinning the claims against them."4 The court concluded that the burden
imposed by requiring the 294 defendants to continue to defend the claims
of over 3,000 plaintiffs before discovering which defendants were actually
implicated "is far out of proportion to any benefit to the plaintiffs in withholding this basic information. ' 45 The court held that mandamus was justified because the denial of the discovery in this matter "goes to the very
heart of the defendants' case." 46
c.

Order requiring response to over-broad interrogatory

In Texaco, Inc. v. Sanderson,47 the Texas Supreme Court held that mandamus was appropriate to correct an overly broad interrogatory. In Texaco, the plaintiffs asserted that toxic materials and asbestos present at the
work place resulted in the deaths of their husbands. 48 The principal issue
in the case was "whether defendants were grossly negligent in exposing
'49
[the] decedents to asbestos, benzene, and other such toxic substances.
During discovery, the plaintiffs requested production of "all documents
written by [Texaco's corporate safety director] that concern safety, toxicology, and industrial hygiene, epidemiology, fire protection and training."' 50 The defendants argued that the request was over-broad "because
it [was] not limited to information concerning employees' exposure to asbestos and benzene (the only substances ... mentioned in the plaintiff's
pleadings) or even to toxic substances generally." 5 1 In fact, the request
was not limited in any way to time, place or subject matter. The plaintiffs
argued they were entitled
to the documents to show defendants' "state of
52
mind" about safety.
The supreme court held that a request for discovery reasonably tailored to include only matters relevant to the case is not over-broad
53
merely because it may call for some information of doubtful relevance.
However, the court concluded that the request in Texaco was "not close"
54
and observed that the defendants were entitled to relief by mandamus.
5
5
Similarly, in Dillard Department Stores, Inc. v. Hall, the Texas
Supreme Court conditionally granted mandamus, holding that a "twentystate search for documents over a five-year period is [an] overly broad
[request for production of documents] as a matter of law." 56 In Dillard,a
false arrest case, the plaintiff sought, through requests for production of
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
dition;
55.
56.

Id.
Id. at 772.
Able Supply, 898 S.W.2d at 772.
898 S.W.2d 813, 815 (Tex. 1995) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam).
Id. at 814.
Id. at 815.
Id. at 814.
Id.
Texaco, 898 S.W.2d at 814.
Id. at 815.
Id. The court held that the request was "not merely an impermissible fishing expeit [was] an effort to dredge the lake in hopes of finding a fish." Id.
909 S.W.2d 491 (Tex. 1995) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam).
Id. at 492.
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documents, incident reports and claims files for 668 customers who had
filed false arrest claims against the defendant from stores across the country during the years 1984 through 1992. The trial court ordered produc57
tion of the documents.
Although the plaintiff's petition stated only a simple claim for false
arrest, in response to the defendant's mandamus petition, the plaintiff explained he needed the production of the requested reports and claims "to
'5 8
explore whether he [could] in good faith allege racial discrimination.
Conditionally granting mandamus, the supreme court held "this is the
very kind of 'fishing expedition' that is not allowable under rule 167 of
the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure. ' 59 Mandamus was proper, the court
concluded, because the discovery order was "well outside the bounds of
6°
proper discovery" and therefore constituted an abuse of discretion.
In addition, the court held the trial court's denial of defendants' claim
of privilege regarding this request was an abuse of discretion because defendants are not required to assert privilege except in response to an "ap'6 1
propriate discovery request."
d.

Order to answer interrogatories regarding attorneys' fees

Although only the plaintiffs in MCI Telecommunications Corp. v.

Crowley62 sought recovery of attorneys' fees, the trial court ordered the

defendant MCI to answer an interrogatory requesting detailed information about the names, billing rates, and number of hours billed by all MCI
attorneys (in-house and outside counsel), as well as the total amount of
legal fees incurred by MCI in the case. Concluding MCI's attorneys' fees
in its defense of the case were "patently irrelevant" and not reasonably
calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence, the Fort Worth
63
Court of Appeals held that the trial court had abused its discretion.
Determining that the request imposed a disproportionate burden on MCI
that amounted to harassment, the court held that MCI had no adequate
64
remedy by appeal.
e.

Refusal to disqualify counsel
Mandamus is an appropriate remedy when a trial court refuses to disqualify counsel upon a showing of a conflict of interest. For example, in
Texaco Inc. v. Garcia,65 the trial court refused to grant the defendant's
motion to disqualify the plaintiff's counsel although the evidence re57. Id. at 491.
58. Id. at 492.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
by not
clearly
64.
65.

Id. (citing Loftin v. Martin, 776 S.W.2d 145, 148 (Tex. 1989) (orig. proceeding)).
Dillard, 909 S.W.2d at 492 (quoting Sanderson, 898 S.W.2d at 815).
Id.
899 S.W.2d 399 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1995, orig. proceeding).
Id. at 403-04. The court also held that MCI had not waived its relevance objection
presenting evidence on it at the trial court hearing because information that is
irrelevant does not require proof. Id. at 402.
Id. at 404-05.
891 S.W.2d 255 (Tex. 1995) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam).
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flected that plaintiff's counsel was previously employed at a law firm that
represented the defendant in substantially related matters. In fact, the
plaintiff's counsel had defended the defendant in a lawsuit strikingly similar to the lawsuit brought by the plaintiff. The supreme court conditionally granted a writ of mandamus, holding that the trial court abused its
66
discretion in denying the defendant's motion to disqualify.
In a similar case, the Texas Supreme Court held that the trial court
abused its discretion in refusing to disqualify new co-counsel employed
by the plaintiff's counsel about a month before trial. 67 The new co-counsel had been, during the pendency of the lawsuit, employed as a lawyer at
defense counsel's law firm, although he had not worked directly on the
case while at the firm. The supreme court conditionally granted mandamus, directing the trial court to vacate its order denying the plaintiff's
68
motion for disqualification.
f. Order assessing excessive fine for contempt
In Rosser v. Squier,6 9 the Texas Supreme Court held that mandamus
will lie to remedy a court's order assessing an excessive fine for contempt
because the fine is void. The trial court in Rosser assessed relator $45,000
for six counts of contempt, but a trial court lacks jurisdiction to assess a
fine of more than $500 for each contempt. 70 The supreme court conditionally granted a writ of mandamus directing the trial court to reduce the
fine to $3000.71
g. Order sustaining affidavit of inability to pay
The supreme court in Smith v. McCorkle72 held that mandamus is the
appropriate remedy when a contest to an affidavit of inability to pay is
improperly sustained. 73 In Smith, the order sustaining the contest was
oral, not written, so the appellate. court had to disregard the order and
look only to appellants' affidavit, which conclusively demonstrated inability to pay.
h.

Order of continuance

The Waco Court of Appeals held in Walls Regional Hosp. v. Altaras74
that mandamus will lie to require a trial court to dissolve an order continuing the relator/hospital's hearing on a staff doctor's application for reap66. Id. at 257.

67. Henderson v. Floyd, 891 S.W.2d 252, 253-54 (Tex. 1995) (orig. proceeding ) (per

curiam).
68. Id at 255.

69. 902 S.W.2d 962 (Tex. 1995) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam).

70.
71.
72.
73.
74.

See TEx. GOV'T CODE § 21.002(b) (Vernon 1988).
Rosser, 902 S.W.2d at 962.
895 S.W.2d 692 (Tex. 1995) (orig. proceeding).
Id. at 692.
903 S.W.2d 36 (Tex. App.-Waco 1994, orig. proceeding).
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pointment to staff membership and clinical privileges. 75 The trial court
had ordered a continuance, pending a pretrial hearing in a cause pending
on its docket in which the doctor was suing the relator/hospital. The hospital argued the trial court had no jurisdiction to enter the order until its
hearing was completed and the "continuance" was essentially an injunction that interfered with the hospital's administrative proceedings before
76
they were completed.
The Waco Court of Appeals determined that the trial court had jurisdiction, but it did not address the injunction issue. Rather, the court
based its decision on the exhaustion of remedies doctrine and found a
clear abuse of discretion in the trial court's interference with the professional review proceedings prior to their exhaustion under the hospital's
bylaws. 77 The appellate court noted the public interest served by the professional review process, created to provide an efficient and expeditious
determination, within the peculiar expertise of those participating in the
process, of whether the doctor's conduct negatively affected the quality of
78
medical care at the hospital.
The court of appeals further held that the hospital had no adequate
remedy at law because, without mandamus relief, "[the hospital] and the
public will be deprived of the benefits of the professional-review process
and, most importantly, the public interest served by an efficient and expe'7 9
ditious review process will be defeated.
i.

Void orders

In Thomas v. Miller,80 the trial court issued a summary judgment during the pendency of a bankruptcy action in violation of the automatic
stay. The court of appeals held that "any order or judgment entered during the pendency of a proceeding in bankruptcy is void, being entered in
contravention of the automatic stay provided by the Bankruptcy Code."81
Noting that a trial court has the duty to vacate the entry of a void judgment, and has no discretion to refuse to set aside such a judgment, the
court of appeals held that "[m]andamus [is] a proper mode of attack upon
the void judgment. '82 The court of appeals observed that the relator had
no adequate remedy by appeal; "there [was] no judgment from which an
appeal [could] be taken because the order issued by the trial court was
void."'83 The court held that the relator should not be required to attack
the judgment collaterally in multiple proceedings every time an attempt
75. Id. at 37.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 43.

78. Id.

79. Altras, 903 S.W.2d at 44 (citing Jack B. Anglin Co., Inc. v. Tipps, 842 S.W.2d 266,

272-73 (Tex. 1992) (orig. proceeding).
80. 906 S.W.2d 260 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1995, orig. proceeding).
81. Id. at 261. See 11 U.S.C.A. § 362 (West 1993 & Supp. 1995).
82. Thomas, 906 S.W.2d at 262-63.

83. Id. at 263.
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to execute upon it was made. 84
B.
1.

INTERLOCUTORY APPEALS

Probate Court Rulings

Although some interlocutory orders are appealable under the general
Probate Code provision governing appeals,8 5 the Texas Supreme Court
held that the partial summary judgment in Crowson v. Wakeham 86 was
not final for purposes of appeal until the trial court entered the order
severing the judgment. The probate order in that case was a ruling in an
heirship proceeding brought by a woman claiming to be the decedent's
common law wife and joined by other claimants to the decedent's
property.
The court of appeals dismissed the appeal as untimely on the basis that
the summary judgment order declaring that the appellant was not the
decedent's common-law wife, and therefore not an heir of the decedent,
appeared to have adjudicated all of the appellant's substantive rights concerning the decedent's estate and was final despite the pending claims of
other would-be heirs. 87 The court therefore held that the appellate timetable ran from the date of that order, not from the order of severance. 88
The supreme court disagreed, holding that the appellate timetable ran
from the date of the severance order. To be final, a probate order must
dispose of "all issue(s) involved in that particular phase of the probate
proceeding. '89 In Crowson, the "phase" was the entire heirship proceeding resolving all heirship claims. 90 Attempting to resolve the confusion
about finality in the probate context, the supreme court held,
If there is an express statute ... declaring a phase of the probate
proceedings to be final and appealable, that statute controls. Otherwise, if there is a proceeding of which the order in question may
logically be considered a part, but one or more pleadings also part of
that proceeding raise issues or parties not disposed of, then the probate order is interlocutory. 91
As only the appellant's heirship status had been determined by the particular summary judgment, and there were numerous other intervenors
whose heirship status had yet to be determined, the partial summary
judgment was not final for appeal purposes until severed, and the appeal
92
from the severance order was timely.
84. Id

85. Section 5(f) of the Texas Probate Code states: "(f) All final orders of any court
exercising original probate jurisdiction shall be appealable to the courts of appeals." TEx.
PROB. CODE ANN. § 5(f) (Vernon Supp. 1993).
86. 897 S.W.2d 779 (Tex. 1995).
87. Id. at 780.
88. Id. at 781 n.2; see TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 5(f) (Vernon Supp. 1993).

89. Crowson, 897 S.W.2d at 782 (quoting Estate of Wright, 676 S.W.2d 161, 163-64
(Tex. App.-Corpus Christi, writ ref'd n.r.e.)).
90. Id.
91. Id. at 783.
92. Id. at 782-83.
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Applying the supreme court's new test from Crowson, the Houston
Court of Appeals, First District, determined in Forlano v. Joyner,93 that a
county court's order granting a transfer of a breach of contract case to
probate court was not immediately appealable. 94 Shortly after the appellant filed suit in county court, the probate court appointed a guardian of
one of the defendants. The defendants then sought a transfer to the pro95
bate court, which the trial court granted.
Analyzing the appealability of the transfer order under the standards
articulated by the supreme court in Crowson, the court of appeals noted
that no express statutes existed declaring a decision to grant or deny a
transfer of a case to probate court to be final and appealable. 96 Reaching
the second prong of the Crowson test, the court observed that the transfer order was logically considered part of the appellant's lawsuit for
breach of contract, not the guardianship proceeding. 97 Finding that the
contract action still had issues not yet decided, the court of appeals concluded that the transfer order was interlocutory and dismissed the
appeal.98
2. Denial of Summary Judgment Based on Official Immunity
The Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code authorizes interlocutory
appeals of denials of motions for summary judgment based on official
immunity. 99 Yet, despite the fact that the motion for summary judgment
denied by the trial court in City of Beverly Hills v. Guevara'00 was based
on the common-law doctrine of official immunity, the Waco Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal for want of jurisdiction, deciding that the City
could not rely upon an individual officer's immunity. 10 1 The plaintiff in
that case sued the City of Beverly Hills for injuries allegedly caused by
one of its police officers in handcuffing the plaintiff but did not sue the
police officer individually. The court of appeals found that the denial of
the City's motion for summary judgment was not subject to interlocutory
appeal under section 51.014(5) because the City was claiming only that its
police officer had official immunity, not that the City itself was im93. 906 S.W.2d 118 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1995, no writ) (per curiam).
94. Id. at 120.
95. Id. at 119.
96. Id. at 119-20.
97. Id. at 120.
98. Forlano,906 S.W.2d at 120.
99. See TEx. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 51.014(5) (Vernon 1995). Under section 51.014(5),

A person may appeal from an interlocutory order of a district court,

county court at law, or county court that:
(5)denies a motion for summary judgment that is based on an assertion of

Id.

immunity by an individual who is an officer or employee of the state or a
political subdivision of the state ....

100. 904 S.W.2d 655 (Tex. 1995) (per curiam).

101. Id.
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mune. 102 The supreme court reversed, making it clear that a city can rely
on the official immunity of its employees and agents, and that the order
was appealable under section 51.014(5) because the motion for summary
judgment was clearly based on official immunity within the meaning of
03
that section.'
The Texas Supreme Court analyzed its jurisdiction over an interlocutory order denying a motion for summary judgment based on a claim of
official immunity in Gonzalez v. Avalos. 10 4 Observing that section
51.014(5) of the Texas Civil Practices and Remedies Code confers jurisdiction upon the court of appeals, not the supreme court, to review such
orders, the supreme court held that supreme court jurisdiction must be
based on the Government Code provision conferring general supreme
court jurisdiction.' 0 5 The supreme court noted, however, that the general
jurisdictional statute is subject to the more specific jurisdictional statutes
applicable in a given case. 10 6 The court found that section 22.225(c) of
the Texas Government Code, allowing appeals only when dissent or conflicts jurisdiction exists, was applicable to the interlocutory order before
the court.10 7 As there was no dissent in the court of appeals, the court
analyzed its conflicts jurisdiction.
To establish conflicts jurisdiction, the supreme court explained, it must
appear that the rulings in the two purportedly conflicting cases are "so far
upon the same state of facts that the decision of one case is necessarily
conclusive of the decision in the other."'10 8 Or, "in other words, the decision must be based practically upon the same state of facts, and announce
antagonistic conclusions. An apparent inconsistency in the principles announced, or in the application of recognized principles, is not sufficient."' 0 9 The court concluded that the decisions allegedly conflicting
with the court of appeals' decision were "factually distinguishable," precluding the court from exercising jurisdiction. 1' 0
3.

Bill of Review Setting Aside PriorJudgment But Failing to Dispose
of Case on Merits

"A bill of review [that] sets aside a prior judgment but does not dispose
of the case on the merits is interlocutory and not appealable.""' Thus,
when a trial court vacates a prior default judgment, and, instead of ren102.
103.
104.
105.

Id.
Id.; see DeWitt v. Harris County, 904 S.W.2d 650 (Tex. 1995).
907 S.W.2d 443 (Tex. 1995).
See TEX. CiV. AND PRAC. REM CODE § 51.014(5) (Vernon Supp. 1996) and TEX.
GOV'T CODE § 22.001 (Vernon 1988).
106. Gonzalez, 907 S.W.2d at 443.
107. Id at 443-44; see TEX. GOV'T CODE §§ 22.225(b)(4) and (c) (Vernon 1988 & Supp.
1996).
108. Gonzalez, 907 S.W.2d at 444 (citing Christy v. Williams, 156 Tex. 555, 298 S.W.2d
565, (1957)).
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Jordan v. Jordan, 907 S.W.2d 471 (Tex. 1995).
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dering judgment for the defendant, orders a trial on the merits, the order
is interlocutory and the court of appeals has no jurisdiction to reverse the
trial court's ruling on the bill of review.'1 2
4. Denial of Class Certification
A denial of class certification is one of the few appealable interlocutory
orders."l 3 In fact, the order must be appealed immediately or an appellant loses the right to challenge the order after final judgment.
In Buffalo Royalty Corp. v. Enron Corp.,114 the plaintiff attempted to
appeal the denial of class certification upon the trial court's entry of final
judgment, two years after the date of the order denying class certification. 115 The Amarillo Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal for want of
jurisdiction, holding that an appellant must perfect its appeal from a denial of class certification within twenty days of the signing of the order or

the appellate court loses jurisdiction to review

it.116

5. Summary Judgments
The Fort Worth Court of Appeals, following Mafrige v. Ross, 117 recently determined that the summary judgment order appealed in Amerivest, Inc. v. Bluebonnet Savings Bank, F.S.B.1 8 was interlocutory
because it contained no Mother Hubbard Clause." i 9 In Amerivest, the
plaintiff sought a declaratory judgment, the imposition of a constructive
trust, and actual damages for breach of contract and conversion, as well
as exemplary damages and attorneys' fees.' 20 The plaintiff moved for
summary judgment, requesting relief on all but its conversion and exemplary damages claims. The trial court granted summary judgment on all
claims pled by the plaintiff except for conversion, exemplary damages,
and attorneys' fees, but the summary judgment order did not contain a
Mother Hubbard Clause. The Fort Worth Court of Appeals therefore
112. Id. at 472.
113. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 51.014(3) (Vernon Supp. 1995). Under

section 51.014(3),
A person may appeal from an interlocutory order of a district court,
county court at law, or county court that:
(3) certifies or refuses to certify a class in a suit brought under Rule 42 of
the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure....
Id.
114. 906 S.W.2d 275 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1995, no writ).
115. As it turns out, the "final judgment" was not "final" for purposes of appeal. Id. at
277. Regardless, even if it had been, the interlocutory appeal was still over two years late.
Id. The court of appeals refused to adopt federal law which permits one to postpone review of a class certification order until entry of final judgment. Id.
116. Id. at 276-77.
117. 866 S.W.2d 590 (Tex. 1993).
118. 897 S.W.2d 513 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1995, writ denied).
119. A "Mother Hubbard Clause" is language to the effect that "all relief not expressly
granted is denied" or "any other statement indicating that the court intended to dispose of
all parties and all issues raised by the pleadings or that all relief not granted is denied." Id.
at 515-16.
120. Id. at 514.
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dismissed the appeal, holding the order
was interlocutory, failing to dis12 1
pose of all of the plaintiff's claims.
6. Staying Execution
An order granting interlocutory relief is not suspended pending appeal
unless supersedeas is granted in accordance with rule 43(b) of the Texas
Rules of Appellate Procedure or unless the appellant is entitled to supersede the judgment without security by giving notice of appeal. 122 The San
Antonio Court of Appeals held in City of San Antonio v. Scott' 23 that the
trial court has discretion to decide whether to permit a governmental entity to supersede enforcement of a temporary injunction pursuant to rule
124
47(f).
In Scott, a trial court entered a temporary injunction on August 16,
1995, ordering the City of San Antonio to give notice to firefighters taking a promotional exam on August 18, 1995 that the plaintiff firefighter
125
was suing the City for failure to promote him to an existing vacancy.
The next day, on August 17, 1995, the City filed a notice of appeal of the
court's temporary injunction requiring the notice. The City did not give
the notice to the firefighters at the exam on August 18. The plaintiff
therefore filed a motion for immediate reinstatement of the trial court's
injunction order, and the City responded that its failure to comply with
the trial court's order to give notice rendered the injunctive order moot.
Both the City and the plaintiff believed the City was entitled to supersede
26
the temporary injunction merely by filing a notice of appeal.
The San Antonio Court of Appeals disagreed, pointing out that the
City's conduct in Scott demonstrated why a temporary injunction against
a governmental entity is not automatically superseded upon the filing of a
121. Id.

122. See TEX. R. APP. P. 43. Rule 43(a) states in pertinent part:
(A) EFFECr OF APPEAL. No order denying interlocutory relief shall be
suspended or superseded by an appeal therefrom.... [T]he pendency of an

appeal from an order granting interlocutory relief does not suspend the order
appealed from unless supersedeas is granted in accordance with subdivision
(b) or unless the appellant is entitled to supersede the judgment without security by giving notice of appeal.
TEX. R. App. P. 43(a).
123. No. 04-95-00651-CV, 1995 WL 569067 (Tex. App.-San Antonio, Sept. 27, 1995),
withdrawn and vacated, No. 04-9500651-CV, 1995 WL 696616 (Tex. App.-San Antonio,
November 22, 1995, n.w.h.) (not designated for publication).
124. Rule 47(f) states:
(F) OTHER JUDGMENT.

When the judgment is for other than money or

property or foreclosure, the security shall be in such amount and type to be
ordered by the trial court as will secure the judgment creditor for any loss or
damage occasioned by the appeal. The trial court may decline to permit the
judgment to be suspended on filing by the judgment creditor of security to be
ordered by the trial court in such an amount as will secure the judgment
debtor in any loss or damage caused by any relief granted if it is determined
on final disposition that such relief was improper.
TEX. R. APP. P. 47(f).
125. 1995 WL 569067 at *1.
126. Iti
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notice of appeal. 127 Permitting automatic supersedeas "would enable a
swift-moving governmental entity to violate an interlocutory order with
impunity."'1 28 The court of appeals overruled the plaintiff's motion to reinstate the injunctive order, concluding that order, never having been superseded, was still in effect. 129 The court instead viewed the plaintiff's
motion as one for temporary relief pending appeal, and ordered the City
to comply with the trial court's order by sending the notice required by
130
the order to all August 18 exam participants.
III. PRESERVATION OF ERROR
A.

OBJECTING TO THE CHARGE

Rule 278 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure outlines the procedure
for preserving the right to complain on appeal about the trial court's error in refusing to submit a jury instruction. Rule 278 states, in pertinent
part: "Failure to submit a definition or instruction shall not be deemed a
ground for reversal of the judgment unless a substantially correct definition or instruction has been requested in writing and tendered by the
party complaining of the judgment.' 3 1 As reflected in the cases discussed below, the supreme court continues to interpret the rule flexibly.
Even if rule 278 is not strictly followed, a party nonetheless has preserved
error in the jury charge if the party makes the trial court reasonably
132
aware of the complaint, timely and plainly, and obtains a ruling.
133
In Lester v. Logan, the plaintiff sued the defendant for breach of the
implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose in connection with the
defendant's sale of hay to the plaintiff because several of plaintiff's cows
died after eating the hay. At the charge conference, the defendant objected to the charge and submitted his requested jury questions, instructions, and definitions. In his requests, defendant submitted a question on
implied warranty and definitions and instructions relating to the terms in
the question. These requests, however, were on a single piece of paper
with one space provided for the trial court to grant and one space provided for the trial court to refuse the group of requests. The trial court
134
refused the group of requests.

On appeal, the defendant complained about the trial court's refusal of
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. id.
130. In an unpublished opinion, the San Antonio Court of Appeals later withdrew and
vacated its opinion upon a showing that the City had complied with the temporary injunction. City of San Antonio v. Scott, No. 04-95-00651-CV, 1995 WL 696616 at *1 (Tex.
App.-San Antonio, Nov. 22, 1995, n.w.h.) (not designated for publication).
131. TEX. R. Civ. P. 278.
132. See State Dep't of Highways and Pub. Transp. v. Payne, 838 S.W.2d 235, 241 (Tex.
1992).
133. 893 S.W.2d 570 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1994), writ denied per curiam, 907
S.W.2d 452 (Tex. 1995).
134. Id. at 577.
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his group of requests. 135 Holding that the defendant waived this complaint, the Corpus Christi Court of Appeals stated that the defendant
failed to submit his requested instruction in substantially correct form because "requested issues and instructions must be submitted separately."'1 36 Failure to tender the instruction on a separate page, the court
held, results in waiver of any error in the trial court's refusal of the
137
request.
The Texas Supreme Court denied the application for writ of error
sought by the defendant, but, citing State Department of Highways v.
Payne,138 explicitly disapproved of the court of appeals' analysis in finding waiver of error in the trial court's refusal of the requested
139
instruction.
Again applying Payne, the Texas Supreme Court in Texas Department
of Human Services v. Hinds140 accepted a request for a wrongly worded
instruction on causation as adequate to apprise the court of the need for a
causation instruction. In that case, the plaintiff/employee brought an action under the Texas Whistleblower Act141 against his former employer
for discrimination occurring after he reported illegal activity by the former employer. At trial, the jury was asked: "Did the Department of
Human Services constructively terminate, or otherwise discriminate,
against Gary Hinds in retaliation for his report [that certain activity] was
42
illegal?"'
The defendant requested, and the trial court refused, the following
"causation" instruction in relation to this question: "You are instructed
that the reporting of these activities must have been the principal reason
for the Texas Department of Human Services' retaliation. You are ina violation
structed that 'the principal reason' means that the reporting of
43
of law was the cause of the harassment or discrimination.'
The trial court did not give any instruction regarding causation. Analyzing whether the defendant preserved error concerning its complaint
about the refused instruction, the supreme court held that the trial court
should have instructed the jury as follows: "An employer does not discriminate against an employee for reporting a violation of law, in good
faith, to an appropriate law enforcement authority, unless the employer's
action would not have occurred when it did had the report not been
made."144
Acknowledging that the defendant did not request the instruction that
should have been given, the supreme court held that under Payne the
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.

Id. at 576-77.
Id.at 577.
Id.
838 S.W.2d 235 (Tex. 1992).
Lester v. Logan, 907 S.W.2d 452, 453 (Tex. 1995) (per curiam).
904 S.W.2d 629 (Tex. 1995).
See Thx. GoV'T CODE ANN. §§ 554.001-.009 (Vernon 1995).
Hinds, 904 S.W.2d at 631.
Id.
Id. at 637.
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defendant's requested instruction nevertheless preserved error because it
"called the trial court's attention to the [missing] causation element."'1 45

B.

PRESERVING ERROR THROUGH MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL

As the appellants discovered in Wilson v. General Motors Acceptance
Corp.,146 under Rule 324 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, a motion
for new trial is a prerequisite to appeal a complaint on which evidence
must be heard. 147 In Wilson, the appellants complained on appeal that
the trial court erred in granting the plaintiff's summary judgment because
the plaintiff did not properly serve them with notice of the summary judgment hearing. 148 The appellants, however, made no motion for continuance or no post-trial motion, and specifically, no motion for new trial,
complaining of the lack of notice. However, "[o]n the sixtieth day following the entry of judgment, the [appellants] filed a formal bill of exceptions
asserting lack of notice of the [summary judgment] hearing."'1 4 9 The trial
court refused to sign and file the bill of exceptions on the basis that it was
50
untimely filed.'
The court of appeals found that the appellants waived their objection
to the summary judgment hearing and entry of judgment because a bill of
exceptions (even if timely) cannot preserve the error of lack of notice for
appellate review. 151 The court held that the lack of notice was a situation
"in which evidence must be heard," and a motion for new trial was the
proper method by which appellants could introduce evidence to controvert proof of service. 152 The bill of exceptions, the court concluded, was
not based on evidence in the record and did no more than raise a fact
53
issue.
In Wirtz v. Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance Co.,154 the appellant
prematurely filed a motion for new trial after the jury verdict but before
the trial court entered judgment. In his motion for new trial, the appellant complained that the jury's responses to three of eight jury questions
were against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence. The
court overruled the motion for new trial in its judgment. The appellant
filed another motion for new trial twenty-nine days after judgment on
grounds other than sufficiency of the evidence. He then filed an amended
motion for new trial seventy-one days after judgment. Neither his second
145. Id. at 637-38.
146. 897 S.W.2d 818 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1995, no writ.)
147. TEX. R. Civ. P. 324(b)(1); see also TEX. R. App. P. 52(d).
Rule 52(d) states, in pertinent part: "A point in a motion for new trial is prerequisite to
appellate complaint in those instances provided in Rule 324(b) of the Texas Rules of Civil
Procedure." TEX. R. App. P. 52(d).
148. 897 S.W.2d at 820.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Wilson, 897 S.W.2d at 820.
154. 898 S.W.2d 414 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1995, no writ).
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nor amended motions were ruled upon by the trial court. 155
On appeal, the appellant attacked the jury's answers to all eight jury
questions as being against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence.' 5 6 The appellees argued the appellant failed to preserve error
with respect to sufficiency of the evidence to support any of the jury questions because his second motion for new trial, filed within thirty days after judgment, was an amended motion for new trial that superseded his
first motion.1 57 They argued that, because the amended motion did not
contain any challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, appellant waived
158
the contentions.
The court of appeals agreed that in order to preserve the contentions
that the jury's responses were against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence, the appellant was required to point out each contention in a motion for new trial. 159 The court held, however, that under
rules 306c and 329b(a) of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, the appellant's premature motion for new trial challenging the sufficiency of the
evidence with respect to the jury's answers to three of eight jury questions was deemed to have been filed on the date of, but subsequent to,
the time of signing of the judgment. 160 The court's overruling of the motion in its judgment was also deemed to have been subsequent to the
signing of the judgment. As a result, the appellant's first motion for new
trial, by which he challenged the jury's responses to three of the eight jury
questions as being against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence, preserved those contentions for appellate review. 161 The court
also held, however, that the appellant's contentions regarding the remaining five jury questions had been waived because he raised no complaints
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.

Id. at 418-19.
Id. at 419.
Id.
Id.
Wirtz, 897 S.W.2d at 419; see TEx. R. Cv. P. 324(b)(2)-(3); TEx. R. App. P. 52(d).
Rule 324 states, in pertinent part: "(B) MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL REQUIRED. A point in a
motion for new trial is a prerequisite to the following complaints on appeal:
(2) A complaint of factual insufficiency of the evidence to support a jury finding;
(3) A complaint that a jury finding is against the overwhelming weight of the evidence."
TEx. R. Civ. P. 324(b)(2)-(3).
160. Rule 306c states:
No motion for new trial or request for findings of fact and conclusions of
law shall be held ineffective because prematurely filed; but every such motion shall be deemed to have been filed on the date of but subsequent to the
time of signing of the judgment the motion assails, and every such request for
findings of fact and conclusions of law shall be deemed to have been filed on
the date of but subsequent to the time of signing of the judgment.
TEX. R. Civ. P. 306c.

Rule 329b(a) states:
The following rules shall be applicable to motions for new trial and motions to modify, correct, or reform judgments (other than motions to correct
the record under Rule 316) in all district and county courts:
(a) A motion for new trial, if filed, shall be filed prior to or within thirty
days after the judgment or other order complained of is signed.
TEx. R. Crv. P. 329b(a).
161. Wirtz, 898 S.W.2d at 419-20.
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about those questions in his first motion for new trial. 162
Notably, the court observed that the appellant's "second motion [for
new trial], although filed within thirty days after the judgment was signed,
was a nullity because it was not filed, as [rule 329b(b)] mandates, before
the first motion was overruled."'1 63

C.

REQUESTING ENTRY OF JUDGMENT

When a party asks the trial court to render judgment for a particular
amount and the court complies with the request by rendering judgment
164
for that amount, the party cannot challenge the judgment on appeal.
Without qualifying their request, the appellants in Casu v. Marathon Refining Co. moved the trial court to enter judgment awarding them
$50,000, plus pre-judgment interest of $26,778, for a total amount of
$76,788. The final judgment entered by the trial court awarded the appellants everything they requested.
Holding that the appellants had waived their right to complain about
the trial court's judgment, the court of appeals stated that, to preserve the
right to complain about a judgment on appeal, "a movant for judgment
should state in its motion to enter judgment that it agrees only with the
form of the judgment, and note its disagreement with the content and
result of the judgment."'1 65 An unqualified motion unreservedly inviting
the trial court to enter the judgment requested may not be attacked on
appeal. 166
D.

SUBMITTING EVIDENCE AT TRIAL

To complain of the trial court's exclusion of evidence, a party must
make an offer of the evidence excluded, state on the record the reasons
167
why the evidence is admissible, and obtain a ruling from the trial court.
Without such information, the appellate court cannot determine whether
the trial court erred. 168
E. CHALLENGES FOR CAUSE
To preserve error when the trial court overrules a challenge for cause
to a prospective juror,
a party must give notice to the trial court of two things, prior to exercising any peremptory challenges: (1) the party must inform the trial
court that it will exhaust all peremptory challenges; and (2) the party
must inform the trial court that after exercising all its peremptory
162. Id. at 420.

163. Id. at 419 n.2.
164. Casu v. Marathon Refining Co., 896 S.W.2d 388, 389 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st
Dist.] 1995, writ denied).
165. Id. at 390; see First Nat'l Bank v. Fojtik, 775 S.W.2d 632, 633 (Tex. 1989).
166. Casu, 896 S.W.2d at 390.
167. See Veale v. Teledyne Indus., Inc., 899 S.W.2d 239 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th
Dist.] 1995, writ denied). A motion in limine alone preserves nothing. Id. at 242
168. Id. at 243.
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challenges,
specific objectionable jurors will remain on the jury
169
list.

To avoid waiving such error, the party must timely bring the error to the
170
attention of the trial court prior to making his peremptory challenges.
The critical issue in Brown v. Pittsburg Corning Corp., where the appellant challenged the trial court's failure to strike a juror for cause, was the
timing of the plaintiffs' delivery of their list of peremptory challenges to
the trial court. 17 1 In what the concurrence described as a hypertechnical
application of the supreme court's rule in Hallet, the court of appeals in
Brown held that Hallet required proof that the plaintiffs had given the
trial court the two-part notice prior to exercising their peremptory
strikes. 172 The court held that a party exercises its peremptory strikes
when the party physically delivers the list of strikes to the court. 73 As it
was unclear from the appellate record whether counsel for the plaintiffs
physically handed the list of peremptory challenges to the trial court immediately before or immediately after making the two-part announcement required under Hallet, the court of appeals in Brown held that the
plaintiffs failed to bring forth a record demonstrating error. 174 As a re75
sult, any error was waived.
The Brown concurrence, concluded that the supreme court in Hallet did
not intend such a hypertechnical application of the delivery and announcement rule. 1 76 The record, according to the concurrence, reflected
that counsel made his two-part announcement either moments before or
moments after he physically tendered his strike list to the court and that
this action was sufficient to preserve the issue for review. 177 Nonetheless,
the concurrence found no error in the trial court's failure to strike the
8

juror.

17

IV. EXTENDING THE APPELLATE TIMETABLE
A.
1.

REQUEST FOR FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS

Summary Judgment

A request for findings of fact and conclusions of law is inappropriate
following entry of a summary judgment and will not operate to extend
the appellate timetable. The appellant in Chavez v. Housing Authority of
169. Brown v. Pittsburgh Coming Corp., 909 S.W.2d 101 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th
Dist.] 1995, no writ) (citing Hallet v. Houston N.W. Medical Ctr., 689 S.W.2d 888 (Tex.

1985)).
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.

Id. at 102.
lht at 104.
Id.
Id.
Brown, 909 S.W.2d at 104.
Id.
Itt at 105 (Hudson, J., concurring).
lt
Id.
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the City of El Paso179 appealed from an adverse summary judgment in the
county court. She filed a request for findings of fact and conclusions of
law on July 19, 1993, and a notice of past due findings of fact and conclusions of law on August 13, 1993. She did not file a motion for new trial.
The appellant filed a cash deposit in lieu of bond on September 27, 1993.
On rehearing, the El Paso Court of Appeals withdrew its published opinion in Chavez v. Housing Authority of the City of El Paso 80 and dis18 1
missed the appeal for want of jurisdiction.
The court of appeals noted that under rule 41(a)(1) of the Texas Rules
of Appellate Procedure, an appellant has ninety days after the judgment
is signed to perfect his appeal "if a timely motion for new trial has been
filed by any party or if any party has timely filed a request of findings of
fact and conclusions of law in a case tried without a jury."'1 82 Under rule
296 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, the court continued, only a
party in a case "tried in the district or county court without a jury" is
entitled to findings of fact and conclusions of law. 18 3 Findings of fact, the
court determined, are appropriate only in those circumstances in which
the trial court is "called upon to determine questions of fact."' 184 In a
summary judgment proceeding, where there is no genuine issue of material fact, the case has not been "tried" within the scope of rule 296 or for
85
the purpose of requesting findings of fact and conclusions of law.'
Noting the recent supreme court decision in Linwood v. NCNB
Texas,' 8 6 the court of appeals in Chavez reversed its earlier decision that
the timeliness of a post-judgment motion, rather than its form content, or
effectiveness, controlled the extension of appellate deadlines. 187 Because
the appellant's summary judgment case was not "tried without a jury,"
and she did not file a motion for extension of time to file a cash deposit or
appeal bond, her attempted appeal was held to be a nullity necessitating
dismissal. 188 The court of appeals further noted that a request for findings of fact and conclusions of law is not a bona fide attempt to invoke
appellate jurisdiction.' 8 9 Only appeal bonds, notices of appeal, or affidavits of inability to pay costs on appeal invoke the jurisdiction of a court of
appeals. 19°
The court of appeals queried whether a motion for new trial is any
more appropriate if findings of fact and conclusions of law are inappro179. 897 S.W.2d 523 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1995, writ denied).
180. 876 S.W.2d 416 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1994), withdrawn and substituted, 897 S.W.2d
523 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1995, writ denied).
181. 897 S.W.2d at 525.
182. Id at 525; TEx. R. App. P. 41(a)(1) (emphasis added).
183. Chavez, 897 S.W.2d at 525.
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. 885 S.W.2d 102 (Tex. 1994).
187. Chavez, 897 S.W.2d at 525.

188. Id at 526.
189. Id.
190. Id
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priate to extend the appellate timetable because a summary judgment
does not constitute a "trial," and no "trial" was actually had. 191 Practitioners are well-advised to craft a motion for rehearing on summary judgment as a motion for new trial, or in the alternative, to modify, correct, or
reform the judgment.
2. Dismissalfor Want of Prosecution
The Fort Worth Court of Appeals declined to follow the Chavez court's
conclusion that cases disposed of by an evidentiary hearing where the
court resolves disputed issues of fact are cases that have been "tried"
under rule 54(a) of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure. In Phillips v.
Beavers,192 that court held that a request for findings of fact and conclusions of law will not extend the appellate timetable in a case dismissed for
want of prosecution, even though the trial court held an evidentiary hear193
ing on the motion to dismiss for want of prosecution.
3. Sanctions Dismissal
The appellate timetable for a case dismissed following the imposition
of death penalty discovery sanctions is not extended by the filing of a
request for findings of fact and conclusions of law because a hearing on a
motion for sanctions is not a case "tried without a jury."' 9 4 The appeal
must be perfected within thirty days of the trial court's order dismissing
the case.
B.

POST-JUDGMENT MOTIONS ASSAILING THE TRIAL COURT'S
JUDGMENT

In Gomez v. Texas Department of Criminal Justice,195 the Texas

Supreme Court held that an inmate's "bill of review" filed within thirty
days of the signing of judgment operated to extend the appellate timetable from thirty to ninety days because it "assailed the trial court's judgment.' 96 The court noted, "'any post-judgment motion, which, if

granted, would result in a substantive change in the judgment as entered,
'
extends the time for perfecting the appeal.""

97

191. Id. at 526 n.1.
192. 906 S.W.2d 254 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1995, writ requested) (per curiam).
193. Id. at 255.
194. IKB Indus. (Nigeria) Ltd. v. Pro-Line Corp., 901 S.W.2d 568, 569 (Tex. App.Dallas 1995, writ requested).
195. 896 S.W.2d 176 (Tex. 1995).
196. Id. at 176.
197. Id. at 177 (quoting Miller Brewing Co. v. Villarreal, 822 S.W.2d 177, 179 (Tex.
App.-San Antonio 1991), rev'd on other grounds, 829 S.W.2d 770 (Tex. 1992)). The court
also observed that the prisoner's request for findings of fact and conclusions of law was
untimely because prison officials had to screen outgoing mail, posing the problem that one
party must rely upon its opposing party to file pleadings timely. 896 S.W.2d at 176 n.1.
The court did not, however, reach that issue.
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PAUPERS' AFFIDAVITS

The court of appeals in Stafford v. O'Neill 98 detailed the deadline for
perfecting an appeal after a contest to an affidavit of inability to pay has
been sustained. Under the rules of appellate procedure, the court explained, an indigent whose affidavit of inability to pay is successfully challenged has ten days from the date the contest is sustained to file an
appeal bond. 199 This ten-day period of time is in addition to the original
time for perfecting the appeal.20 0 For example, if an appellant files a motion for new trial, he has ninety days from the date the judgment is signed
to perfect his appeal. If this same appellant files an affidavit of inability
to pay, and a contest to it is sustained, he has the later of two dates to
perfect his appeal-ten days after the court sustained the contest or
ninety days after the court signed the judgment. 201
D.

SUBSEQUENT AND VACATED JUDGMENTS

The appellate timetable is affected when the judgment is modified, corrected, or reformed in any respect. For example, in Wang v. Hsu,20 2 the
trial court entered its first judgment on October 14, 1993. It then entered
a second, identical judgment (except for the date) on November 10, 1993.
On November 15, 1993, the appellants filed a motion for new trial, referring to the October 14 judgment. On November 17, 1993, the trial court
made a notation on the November 10 judgment that it was "set aside,"
but made no mention of the October 14 judgment. On January 19, 1994,
the trial court held a hearing on the motion for new trial, but apparently
stemming from its belief that the October 14 judgment was in effect, determined the motion was already overruled by operation of law. On February 8, 1994, the appellants filed their cost bond.
The appellees argued that by setting aside the November 10 judgment,
the trial court "revived" the October 14 judgment. The appellate timetable therefore ran from October 14, 1993, making the appellants' cost
bond late, having been filed more than ninety days after the October 14
20 3
judgment was signed.
The court of appeals disagreed. "There can only be one final appealable order," the court held. 20 4 "If a judgment is modified, corrected, or
reformed in any respect, the time for appeal runs from the correction
198. 902 S.W.2d 67 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1995, orig. proceeding [leave
denied]).
199. Id. at 67; see TEX. R. App. P.41(a)(2).

The rule states in pertinent part:
"[I1f
a contest to an affidavit in lieu of bond is sustained, the time for filing the bond is
extended until ten days after the contest is sustained unless the trial court finds and recites
that the affidavit is not filed in good faith." Id
200. Stafford, 902 S.W.2d at 67.
201. Id.
202. 899 S.W.2d 409 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1995, writ denied).
203. Id. at 411; see TEX. R. APp. P. 41(a)(1).
204. Wang, 899 S.W.2d at 411.
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date. ' 20 5 The second judgment vacates the first as if the first judgment
was never entered. 20 6 Even if the subsequent judgment is different from
the first judgment only by the signature date, the second judgment replaces the first."' 20 7 As a result, the court held, the November 10 judg208
ment vacated the October 14 judgment.
The court of appeals further held that the trial court's "setting aside" of
the November 10 judgment did not "revive" the vacated October 14 judgment. 2°9 In so holding, the court concluded that any change made to a
judgment must be written." 210 Since the trial court's written order setting
aside the November 14 judgment did not "reinstate" the October 14 judgment, the October 14 judgment was not revived. 2 11 The court concluded
that by signing the November 10 judgment, the trial court vacated the
October 14 judgment. 2 12 After being set aside the November 10 judgment also became "dead" and the October 14 judgment was not revived
because there was no written order reviving it.213 Because no final judgment existed, the court of appeals dismissed the appeal for want of
2 14
jurisdiction.
V. PERFECTION OF APPEAL

A. BONA FIDE ATrEMPT TO INVOKE APPELLATE COURT
JURIsDIcTION

Rules 40 and 41 of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure establish
the process of perfecting an appeal. 21 5 These rules govern juvenile as
well as other civil appeals.21 6 As a result, the failure of a juvenile to file a
cost bond, cash deposit, or affidavit in lieu thereof, under Rules 40 and 41
2 17
results in an unperfected appeal.
In In re C.F., the El Paso Court of Appeals found errors in the juvenile
appellant's attempt to perfect his appeal.2 18 The appellant filed a written
notice of appeal five days after the judgment was signed but missed his
deadline for filing a cost bond. He did not file an extension of time to file
205. Id.

206. Id.
207. Id.The court noted that an exception to this rule exists "when the face of the
record reveals that the trial judge signed a second judgment for the sole purpose of extending the appellate timetables." Id The court noted that there was no indication from
the record as to why the trial court entered the November 10 judgment, but the record did
not demonstrate that the judgment was signed solely to extend the appellate timetables.
Id.

208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.

Wang, 899 S.W.2d at 411.
Id. at 412.
Id
Id
Id.
Wang, 889 S.W.2d at 412.
Id.

215. TEX. R. App. P.40, 41.

216. See In re C.F. v. Texas, 897 S.W.2d 464, 466 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1995, no writ).
217. Id.
218. Id.
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cost bond, an affidavit of inability to pay, or a motion for new trial.2 19
The notice of appeal filed five days after entry of judgment, the court
220
held, was not an instrument that operated to perfect the appeal.
The El Paso Court of Appeals refrained from dismissing the appeal for
want of jurisdiction. Instead, citing Grand PrairieIndependent School
District v. Southern Parks Imports, Inc.,221 the court analyzed the "present status of bona fide attempts to invoke appellate jurisdiction. '' 22 2 The
court pointed out that in Grand Prairie,the supreme court held that "a
court of appeals has jurisdiction over any appeal in which the appellant
files an instrument 'that was filed in a bona fide attempt to invoke appellate court jurisdiction.' ' 223 In such a case, the court should not dismiss
the appeal but permit the appellant an opportunity to amend or refile the
instrument required to perfect the appeal. 224 The court of appeals noted
the supreme court's reliance on Rules 46(f) and 83 of the Texas Rules of
Appellate Procedure for support in its holding. 225 The court of appeals
concluded that the appellant made a bona fide attempt to invoke appellate jurisdiction when he filed the notice of appeal. 226 He cured the defect when he later filed an affidavit of inability to pay appellate
expenses. 227 As a result, the court of appeals had jurisdiction over the
228
appeal.
The proposed changes to rule 40 of Texas' appellate procedure provide
that a notice of appeal is the proper instrument to perfect an appeal, 229 as
it is in federal court. 230 Thus, a cost bond would not be required.
219. See TEX. R. App. P. 41(a)(1)-(2).
220. In re C., 897 S.W.2d at 466.
221. 813 S.W.2d 499 (Tex. 1991).
222. In re C.F., 897 S.W.2d at 467.
223. Id. (quoting Grand Prairie, 813 S.W.2d at 499, in turn quoting Walker v. Blue
Water Garden Apts., 776 S.W.2d 578, 581) (Tex. 1989)).
224. In re C.F., 897 S.W.2d at 467.
225. Id.; see TEX. R. App. P. 46(f), 83 (Vernon 1995).
Rule 46(f) states:
On motion to dismiss an appeal or writ of error for a defect of substance or
form in any bond or deposit given as security for costs, the appellate court
may allow the filing of a new bond or the making of a new deposit in the trial
court on such terms as the appellate court may prescribe.
TEX. R. App. P. 46(f). Rule 83 states:
A judgment shall not be affirmed or reversed or an appeal dismissed for
defects or irregularities, in appellate procedure, either of form or substance,
without allowing a reasonable time to correct or amend such defects or irregularities provided the court may make no enlargement of the time for filing
the transcript and statement of facts ....
TEX. R. App. P. 83.

226. In re C.F., 897 S.W.2d at 468. The court also noted that the proposed amendments
to the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure would make filing a notice of appeal proper.
Id. at 469.
227. Id. at 468.
228. Id.
229. Supreme Court Advisory Committee Proposed Amendments to Texas Rules of
Appellate Procedure, March 21, 1995.
230. See FED. R. App. P. 3.
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B.

THE MAILBOX RULE

The Texas Supreme Court ruled in Lofton v. Allstate Ins. Co.,231 that an
attorney's uncontroverted affidavit may, even in the absence of a postmark or a certificate of mailing, establish a date of mailing for compliance
with Rule 4(b) of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure. 232 In Lofton,
the Beaumont Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal for want of jurisdiction, stating that the appeal bond was due three days prior to the date it
was actually filed. The appellant's attorney, however, filed a sworn affidavit stating that he mailed the appeal bond to the clerk on the last day
for filing. The court of appeals did not address whether the appellant
complied with Rule 4(b) of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure 3 be23
cause there was no evidence of postmark or certificate of mailing.
The supreme court noted that while a postmark under Rule 4(b) is
prima facie evidence of mailing, there was no postmark available in Lofton.2 34 In the absence of a proper postmark or certificate of mailing, the
court held, "an attorney's uncontroverted affidavit may be evidence of
'2 35
the date of mailing.
C.

FINALITY OF JUDGMENTS

When partial summary judgment disposes of one of the plaintiff's two
claims and the plaintiff files a supplemental petition abandoning the remaining claim and a motion for rehearing of the partial summary judgment, the appellate timetable runs not from the date the plaintiff filed her
supplemental petition (which effectively rendered the partial summary
judgment final) but from the date the trial court signed a written order
denying the plaintiff's "motion for rehearing." The Texas Supreme Court
faced this issue in Farmer v. Ben E. Keith Co.,236 where the appellant
perfected her appeal within thirty days from the date of the written order
denying "rehearing." The court of appeals reasoned that the plaintiff's
appeal was untimely because the time for perfecting the appeal ran from
231. 895 S.W.2d 693 (Tex. 1995) (per curiam).
232. Id. at 693-94.
233. Rule 4(b) states, in pertinent part:
If a motion for rehearing, any matter relating to taking an appeal ...from
the trial court to any higher court .... is sent to the proper clerk by first-class
United States mail in an envelope or wrapper properly addressed and
stamped and is deposited in the mail on or before the last day for filing same,
the same, if received by the clerk not more than ten days tardily, shall be
filed by the clerk and be deemed as filed in time; provided, however, that a
certificate of mailing by the United States Postal Service or a legible postmark affixed by the United States Postal Service shall be prima facie evidence of the date of mailing.
TEX. R. App. P. 4(b).
234. 895 S.W.2d at 693.
235. Id. at 693-94 (affirming the same conclusion reached by the Dallas Court of Appeals in Fellowship Missionary Baptist Church of Dallas, Inc. v. Sigel, 749 S.W.2d 186, 188
(Tex. App.-Dallas 1988, no writ)).
236. 907 S.W.2d 495 (Tex. 1995) (per curiam).
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the filing of her supplemental petition. 237
Reversing the court of appeals and holding the appeal timely perfected,
the supreme court stated that when a judgment is interlocutory because it
does not dispose of all parties and issues and a party moves to have
unadjudicated claims or parties removed by severance, dismissal, or nonsuit, "the appellate timetable runs from the signing of a judgment or order disposing of those claims or parties. '238 The appellate timetable, the
court concluded, does not begin running "other than by signed, written
'239
order, even when the signing of such an order is purely ministerial.
The court determined that the trial court's order denying rehearing "is
the only signed, written order which even purports to dispose of [plaintiffs] 'nonsuited' claim and the appeal was perfected within thirty days of
'240
when that order was signed.
In Molina v. Kelco Tool & Die, Inc.,241 a product liability lawsuit, one
of the three defendants filed a motion for summary judgment, which the
trial court granted on September 15, 1993. On September 14, 1993, the
plaintiffs amended their original petition, dropping all parties except the
defendant who had won the summary judgment. In the amended pleading, which was filed with the court on September 16, 1993, the plaintiffs
essentially reasserted the claims against the remaining defendant that had
been previously disposed of by summary judgment. The trial court signed
a final take-nothing judgment against the plaintiffs on October 13, 1993.
The plaintiffs did not file a motion for new trial but perfected their appeal
on November 12, 1993.
The defendant argued that the court of appeals lacked jurisdiction to
entertain the appeal because the interlocutory partial summary judgment
entered September 13 was made final on either September 14 or 16, 1993,
when the plaintiffs amended their original petition to dispose of all parties and issues except the defendant for whom summary judgment had
been granted. 242 The plaintiffs did not file their cost bond until November 12, 1993, more than thirty days after the September 14 or 16
24 3
amendment.
237. Id at 496.
238. Id.
239. Id. (citing TEX. R. App. P. 5). Rule 5 states, in pertinent part:
(B) BEGINNINGS OF PERIODS IN CIVIL CASES.

(1) Date of Signing. In civil cases, the date a judgment or order is signed
as shown of record shall determine the beginning of the periods described by
these rules for filing in the trial court the various documents in connection
with an appeal, including but not limited to an appeal bond, certificate of
cash deposit, or notice or affidavit in lieu thereof .....
TEX. R. App. P. 5(b)(1).
240. Farmer,907 S.W.2d at 496.
241. 904 S.W.2d 857 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1995, no writ).
242. Id. at 859.

243. The appellee argued that the partial summary judgment became final on September 14, 1993 because, under Rule 5 of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure, a petition is
deemed filed on the date it was mailed. Molina, 904 S.W.2d at 859. The appellee argued,
alternatively, that the judgment became final on September 16, 1993, the date the amended
petition was received by the district clerk. Id. See TEx. R. App. P. 41(a)(1) (if no motion
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The court of appeals rejected the appellees' arguments, holding that
the appellate timetable was not triggered until the signing of the October
13 order.244 Although the signing of the order was merely a "ministerial
act," the court held, it was necessary to commence the appellate timeta12, 1993 filing of the cost bond properly perfected
bles. 24 5 The November246
appeal.
appellants'
the
VI. THE RECORD ON APPEAL
A.

DESIGNATING THE RECORD

The appellants in Birran v. Don Wetzel & Assoc. 247 filed a partial statement of facts under Rule 53(d) of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure. Unfortunately, the appellants failed to comply with the
requirement of Rule 53(d) that "a statement of the points to be relied on"
248 Citing the
be included in a request for a partial statement of facts.
Texas Supreme Court's decision in Christiansen v. Prezelski,24 9 the court
in Birran held that although it is committed to liberality in the construction of briefing rules, no reversible error can be found when appellant
fails to bring forward a complete statement of facts or comply with the
a list of points of error on which
requirements of Rule 53(d) by providing250
the appellant intends to rely on appeal.
The court noted that under Rule 53(d), the appellant "receives the significant benefit of the presumption on appeal that 'nothing omitted from
the record is relevant to any of the points specified or to the disposition
of the appeal.' ' 251 On the other hand, the failure to submit specified
points leads to "dire" consequences-the missing portions of the record
2 52
are presumed to be relevant and to support the trial court's judgment.

B.

LOST OR DESTROYED RECORD

The party requesting a remand for a new trial based on the argument
that exhibits offered at trial were lost or destroyed has the burden of
presenting evidence that the exhibits were in fact lost or destroyed and
not just inadvertently omitted from the transmitted record. 2 53 In Owensfor new trial has been filed, an appeal bond or other perfecting instrument must be filed
with the district clerk within thirty days after the signing of a final judgment).
244. Molina, 904 S.W.2d at 860.
245. Id
246. Id.
247. 894 S.W.2d 552 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1995, writ denied).
248. Id. at 553. TEX. R. App. P. 53(d).
249. 782 S.W.2d 842 (Tex. 1990).
250. Birran, 894 S.W.2d at 553.
251. Id. at 554 (quoting Steger & Bizzell, Inc. v. VandeWater Constr., Inc., 811 S.W.2d
687, 690 (Tex. App.-Austin, 1991, writ denied)).
252. Id.
253. See TEX. R. App. P. 50(e). Rule 50(e) states:
When the record or any portion thereof is lost or destroyed it may be substituted in the trial court and when so substituted the record may be prepared and transmitted to the appellate court as in other cases. If the
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Illinois, Inc. v. Chatham,254 the appellants asked the court of appeals to
remand the case for a new trial because three summaries were missing
from the appellate record: a summary of plaintiffs' interrogatory answers,
medical record summaries presented as exhibits at trial, and summaries of
biographical and medical information concerning each plaintiff. 255 The
court rejected the first two claims because although the interrogatory
summary was unsuccessfully offered as an exhibit during trial, it was
made part of the record during a bill of exceptions and there was no evidence in the record to show that the medical record summaries actually
had been lost or destroyed. 256 Absence from the appellate record alone
is not sufficient.
The appellants successfully argued, however, that an original exhibit
notebook containing medical evidence and biographical summaries of
each of the 587 plaintiffs was lost or destroyed. 257 The evidence in posttrial hearings reflected the notebook was clearly missing. At trial, the
jurors were given an empty notebook to fill with copies of each summary
as the summary was admitted into evidence; the jurors were not given
duplicates of the original notebook. Rather, the jurors were responsible
for compiling their own notebooks. After the verdict, one notebook was
boxed and sealed as the original. Some of the jurors took their notebooks home and others left them in the jury deliberation room. The
notebooks left in the deliberation room were destroyed and the sealed
box containing the original notebook disappeared.
The trial court substituted one of the notebooks taken home by a juror
for the lost original notebook, but the appellants argued that the trial
court had no authority to make the substitution without the agreement of
the appellants.258 The appellees argued that exhibits were part of the
transcript and not the statement of facts, and therefore, under Rule 50(e),
the trial court had the authority to make the substitution without the
agreement of the appellants. 2 59
The court of appeals rejected that argument. The court held that "exhibits" are part of the "statement of facts" and not the "transcript. ' 260
The court further held that, as part of the statement of facts, exhibits are
appellant has made a timely request for a statement of facts, but the court
reporter's notes and records have been lost or destroyed without appellant's
fault, the appellant is entitled to a new trial unless the parties agree on a
statement of facts.
TEX. R. App. P. 50(e).
254. 899 S.W.2d 722 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1995, writ dism'd).
255. Id. at 725-27.
256. Id. at 727. The facts of the case do not reflect that the appellants even discussed
the allegedly missing exhibits with the court reporter. Presumably, an affidavit from the
court reporter stating that the exhibits had been in his or her possession and were lost or
destroyed would have satisfied the appellant's evidentiary burden under Rule 50(e). Id.;
see TEX. R. App. P. 50(e).
257. Chatham, 899 S.W.2d at 728.
258. Id. at 728.
259. Id.
260. Id. at 729.
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part of the court reporter's "notes and records," as referred to in Rule
50(e). 26 1 Because the exhibits were part of the statement of facts and,
therefore, part of the court reporter's records, the trial court did not have
authority under Rule 50 to substitute the juror's notebook for the lost
notebook without the appellants' agreement. 262 The court held, as a re26 3
sult, that the appellants were entitled to a new trial.
C.

OBTAINING THE STATEMENT OF FACTS

The court reporter is under a duty to furnish a trial record upon proper
request.2 64 The court reporter's failure to do so may warrant relief by
mandamus. For example, in Texas v. Creel,265 the court reporter failed to
prepare and file the statement of facts despite five extensions of time.
The appellant sought, and was granted, a writ of mandamus from the
Waco Court of Appeals compelling the court reporter to fulfill her duties
266
under Rule 11 of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure.
The incapacity and incompetency of the court reporter to prepare and
file the statement of facts may render the statement of facts "lost," requiring a remand of the case for a new trial.267 In Hernandez, the court
reporter did not complete and file the statement of facts, even after three
extensions of time, because of a debilitating illness. After granting extensions of time and finally abating the appeal and remanding the case to the

trial court for a hearing to ensure the filing of the statement of facts, the
court of appeals determined that due to his illness, the court reporter
would not be able to complete the statement of facts in a timely fashion,
268
if at all.

Instead of ordering another court reporter to transcribe the ill court
reporter's notes, the San Antonio Court of Appeals concluded that the
court reporter's illness rendered the statement of facts, "for all intents
and purposes, lost, through no fault of the appellant" because another
court reporter would not be able to certify to the accuracy of the resulting
270
statement of facts.269 The court reversed and remanded for a new trial.
261. Id. at 729.
262. Chatham, 899 S.W.2d at 733.
263. Id The proposed amendment to TEX. R. App. P. 50 provides for a new trial when
"a significant portion of the court reporter's notes and records have been lost or destroyed
without the appellant's fault."
264. TEX. R. App. P. 11. Rule 11(a)(4) states that it is the court reporter's duty to
prepare "official transcripts of all such evidence or other proceedings, or any portion
thereof, subject to the laws of this state, these rules and the instructions of the presiding
judge of the court .... The proposed amendment to TEX. R. App. P. 55 makes it clear
that it is the court reporter's duty to file the statements of facts but only after payment or
arrangement to pay the fee for preparation. See Supreme Court Advisory Committee Proposed Amendments to Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure, March 21, 1995.
265. 895 S.W.2d 899 (Tex. App.-Waco 1995, no writ).
266. Id at 899.
267. See Hernandez v. JLG Indus., Inc., 905 S.W.2d 778 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1995,

no writ).
268. 1d at 780.
269. Id (citing TEX. R. App. P. 50(e)).
270. Idt
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SUPPLEMENTING THE RECORD POST-SUBMISSION

Although a court of appeals has broad discretion under Rule 55 of the
Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure to permit or deny supplementation
of the record to include omitted matters, the Dallas Court of Appeals
abused its discretion in Silk v. Terrill.2 71 There the court refused to permit supplementation of an affidavit that was part of the trial court record
but inadvertently omitted from the appellant's record designation. 272 In
Silk, a summary judgment case, the appellant erroneously thought that an
affidavit proffered by the appellee in support of his motion for summary
judgment was attached to the appellee's summary judgment motion
when, in fact, the affidavit had been filed as a document separate from
the motion. Thinking the affidavit was attached to the motion, the appellant designated only the motion for summary judgment in her record
designation. Although the appellant discovered her error prior to filing
her appellate brief, she did not seek supplementation of the record but
instead attached a copy of the affidavit to her brief and notified the appellee of the situation in case he wanted to cite to the affidavit in his
response to her brief.
The appellee did not raise a reply point regarding the missing affidavit
or challenge the sufficiency of the record for appellate review. TWo minutes before oral argument, however, counsel for the appellee told appellant's attorney he intended to argue that the absence of the affidavit
rendered the record insufficient for appellate review. He did so, and the
Dallas Court of Appeals affirmed the summary judgment without reaching the merits because of the appellant's failure to bring forward a sufficient record. 273 The appellant filed a post-submission motion to
supplement the record with the affidavit, but the court of appeals denied
271. 898 S.W.2d 764 (Tex. 1995) (per curiam).
272. Id. at 765-66. Rule 55 states, in pertinent part:
(B) BEFORE SUBMISSION.

If anything material to either party is omitted

from the transcript or statement of facts, before submission the parties by
stipulation, or the trail court, upon notice and hearing, either before or after

the record has been transmitted to the appellate court, or the appellate court,
on a proper suggestion or on its own initiative, may direct a supplemental
record to be certified and transmitted by the clerk of the trial court or the
official court reporter supplying such omitted matter. The appellate court

shall permit it to be filed unless the supplementation will unreasonably delay

disposition of the appeal.
(c) DEFEC-S APPEARING AT OR AFTER SUBMISSION. Should it be apparent during the submission or afterwards that the case has not been properly
prepared as shown in the transcript, or properly presented in the brief or
briefs, or that the law and authorities have not been properly cited, which

will enable the court to decide the case, it may decline to receive the submission; or, if received, may set it aside and make such orders as may be necessary to secure a more satisfactory submission of the case; or should it appear

to the court, after submission of the cause, that the statement of facts has

been prepared in violation of the rules, the court may require the appellant
to furnish a proper statement of facts, and upon his failure to do so may
disregard it.
TEX. R. APP. P. 55(b)-(c).

273. Silk, 898 S.W.2d at 765-66.
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the motion. 2 74
The Texas Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case to the court

of appeals. 275 In doing so, the supreme court noted that there was never
any dispute that the affidavit had been part of the trial court record. 276
"Judicial economy," the supreme court held, "is not served when a case,

ripe for 7 7decision, is decided on a procedural technicality of this
2
nature."

E. LATE-FILED TRANSCRIPT
In Knight v. Sam Houston Memorial Hospital,278 the appellant's transcript was due to be filed in the court of appeals on April 4, 1995. The
record was filed two days late, on April 6, 1995. The appellant did not file
a motion for extension of time to file the transcript. 279 The court of appeals held that it had no authority to consider a late transcript, and therefore had nothing to review because the appellant failed to timely file a
280
motion for extension of time in which to file the transcript.
The appellant argued that the court of appeals' granting one of the

appellees' motion for extension of time made it unnecessary for the appellant to ask for an extension also.281 The court rejected this argument
on the basis that the appellee's request encompassed none of the material
that must be included in the original transcript under Rule 51(a) of the
Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure. 28 2 The appellee's request included

274. Id.
275. Id. at 766.
276. Id
277. Id. The proposed amendment to Rule 55 of TEX. R. App. P. would resolve the
issue in Silk by allowing any party, the trial court or appellate court to supplement the
record by sending a letter, either pre-submission or post-submission, to the trial court clerk
requesting the supplement. See Supreme Court Advisory Committee Proposed Amendments to the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure March 21, 1995. On remand in Silk, the
Dallas Court of Appeals considered the omitted affidavit and reversed and remanded the
case for new trial. See Silk v. Terrill, No. 05-94-00006-CV, 1995 WL 559984 *3 (Tex.
App.-Dallas, Sept. 18, 1995, no writ) (not designated for publication).
278. 907 S.W.2d 847 (Tex. App.-Houston [ist Dist.] 1995, writ denied)
279. See TEX. R. App. P. 54(c). Rule 54(c) states:
An extension of time may be granted for late filing in a court of appeals of
a transcript or statement of facts, if a motion reasonably explaining the need
therefor is filed by appellant with the court of appeals not later than fifteen
days after the last date for filing the record. Such motion shall also reasonably explain any delay in the request required by Rule 53(a).
TEX. R. App. P. 54(c).
280. Knight, 907 S.W.2d at 848.
281. Id
282. Id.; see TEX. R. App. P. 51(a). Rule 51(a) states:
(A) CoNTENrs. Unless otherwise designated by the parties in accordance
with Rule 50, the transcript on appeal shall include copies of the following: in
civil cases, the live pleadings upon which the trial was held; ... the court's
docket sheet; the charge of the court and the verdict of the jury, or the
court's findings of fact and conclusions of law; the court's judgment or other
order appealed from; any motions for new trial and the order of the court
thereon; any notice of appeal; any appeal bond, affidavit in lieu of bond or
clerk's certificate of a deposit in lieu of bond; any notice of limitation of
appeal in civil cases made pursuant to Rule 40; any formal bills of exception
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only documents that were not included in the appellant's request to prepare the transcript. In fact, the court construed the appellee's motion as a
motion for leave to file a supplemental transcript. 28 3 The court also noted
that under Rule 50(d) of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure, the
appellant has the burden to see that a sufficient record is presented to
show error requiring reversal. 28 4 As a result, the appellant "must independently insure that the appellate record upon which it relies is timely
filed in the appellate court." 285 "[A] party is ill-advised," the court held,
"to assume that an action taken by another party will inure to its
benefit. "286
The Fort Worth Court of Appeals in Phillips v. Beavers28 7 agreed with
the court of appeals in Knight, holding that the court of appeals has no
authority to consider a late-filed record in the absence of a timely motion
for extension of time. 28 In Phillips, the appellants did not file their motion for extension of time within fifteen days after the last date for filing
the record. The Fort Worth Court of Appeals held that the fifteen-day
289
deadline in rule 54(c) "is not discretionary" and dismissed the appeal.
VII. THE APPELLATE BRIEF

A. PoIrs OF ERROR
In Anderson v. Gilbert,290 the defendant appealed from a judgment in a
bench trial awarding the plaintiff the deficiency under a promissory note
after foreclosure of the property securing the note. The court of appeals
held that the appellant's first seven points of error did not present any
justiciable question on appeal because they "attacked the judgment
rather than the specific finding of fact by the trial court .... -291 The
supreme court reversed the court of appeals and remanded the cause to
provided for in Rule 52; in civil cases, a certified bill of costs, including the
cost of the transcript and the statement of facts (if any), showing any credits
for payments made; and, subject to the provisions of paragraph (b) of this
rule, any filed paper any party may designate as material.
TEx. R. App. P. 51(a).
283. Knight, 907 S.W.2d at 848.
284. Id. at 848-49; see TEx. R. App. P. 50(d). Rule 50(d) states: "The burden is on the
appellant, or other party seeking review, to see that a sufficient record is presented to show
error requiring reversal." TEx. R. App. P. 50(d).
285. Knight, 907 S.W.2d at 848-49.
286. Id at 849 (quoting Inman's Corp. v. Transamerica Commercial Fin. Corp. 825
S.W.2d 473 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1991, no writ)).
287. 906 S.W.2d 254 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1995, writ requested).
288. Id. at 255.
289. Id.; see TEx. R. App. P. 54(c). Rule 54(c) states:
An extension of time may be granted for late filing in a court of appeals of
a transcript or statement of facts, if a motion reasonably explaining the need
therefor is filed by appellant with the court of appeals not later than fifteen
days after the last date for filing the record. Such motion shall also reasonably explain any delay in the request required by Rule 53(a).
TEX. R. App. P. 54(c).

290. 897 S.W.2d 783 (Tex. 1995) (per curiam).
291. Id.
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that court. 292 The supreme court emphasized that courts are to construe
rules on briefing liberally and an appellate court should not merely consider the wording of the points of error but also the arguments supporting
293
each point.
Noting that it had the option of either examining the merits of the case
to determine whether any ground supported the court of appeals' judgment or remanding the case to the court of appeals to consider the points
not addressed, the supreme court decided it best served the "goal of judicial economy" to remand the case to the court of appeals for considera294
tion of the unaddressed points.
The proposed amendment to Rule 74 of the Texas Rules of Appellate
Procedure follows the federal model, allowing an appellant to present a
"statement of issues or points presented" instead of the more technical
295
points of error.

B.

LENGTH OF BRIEFS

In Maranatha Temple, Inc. v. Enterprise Products Co.,296 an appeal
from a summary judgment in favor of the defendant, the appellant moved

to file a brief in excess of the fifty-page limit set forth in Texas Rule of

Appellate Procedure 74(h). 297 The court granted the motion, ordering
the appellant's brief "shall not be over 85 pages." 298 Although the appellant's brief technically ended on page eighty-three, on page twenty-one of

its brief, the appellant incorporated into its brief over 200 pages of argument from various pleadings filed in the trial court and made part of the

record on appeal.
The court agreed with the appellees that the appellant's incorporation
of the additional argument into its brief "violated the spirit of Rule
74(h)" as well as the court's order limiting the brief to eighty-five

pages. 299 The court struck from the appellant's brief the material the appellant sought to incorporate, although the court stated it would consider
the material as part of the record.3 °0
292. Id.
293. Id.
294. Id. at 785.
295. See Supreme Court Advisory Committee Proposed Amendments to Texas Rules
of Appellate Procedure, March 21, 1995.
296. 893 S.W.2d 92 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1994, writ dism'd).
297. Id. at 97; see TEX. R. App. P. 74(h). Rule 74(h) states:
(H) LENGTH OF BRIEFS. Except as specified by local rule of the court of
appeals, appellate briefs in civil cases shall.not exceed 50 pages, exclusive of
pages containing the list of names and addresses of parties, the table of contents, index of authorities, points of error, and any addendum containing
statutes, rules, regulations, etc. The court may, upon motion, permit a longer
brief. A court of appeals may direct that a party file a brief, or another brief,
in a particular case. If any brief is unnecessarily lengthy or not prepared in
conformity with these rules, the court may require same to be redrawn.
TEX. R. App. P. 74(h).

298. Maranatha Temple, 893 S.W.2d at 97.
299. Id.
300. Id.
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CITATION OF AUTHORITY

Rule 74(f) of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure requires appellate briefs to include "such discussion of the facts and the authorities relied upon as may be requisite to maintain the point at issue."'30 1 The
in the appellate court's discretion,
failure to do so results in waiver 30unless,
2
permitted.
be
should
rebriefing
The appellant in Happy HarborMethodist Home, Inc. v. Cowins30 3 neglected to include any citation of authority or discussion of facts to support its assertions that the evidence was legally and factually insufficient
to support the jury's findings. Refusing to "do the job of the advocate,"
held that the appellant waived its inadequately
the court of appeals
3 °4
briefed arguments.
On rehearing, the appellant complained that the court erred in refusing
to give it an opportunity to rebrief 30 5 Citing the supreme court's decision in Fredonia State Bank v. American Life Insurance,3°6 the court of
appeals in Cowins noted that it "has some discretion to choose between
30°7
deeming a point waived and allowing amendment or rebriefing.
Overruling the appellant's motion for rehearing and motion for leave to
file an amended brief, the court of appeals recounted the procedural history of the appeal in which appellants had been granted two extensions of
time to file their principal brief, had missed both extended deadlines, and
30 8
had further missed their deadline for filing their motion for rehearing.
VIII. ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS
The Texas Supreme Court considered the timeliness of a motion for
rehearing filed in an administrative appeal in Temple Independent School
District v. English.3°9 The school district in Temple decided not to renew
the respondent school principal's contract. The school district presented
its recommendation to the district's board of trustees, which accepted the
recommendation and, after a hearing, voted not to renew the principal's
contract. The principal appealed to the Commissioner of Education, who
301. TEX. R. App. P. 74(f)(2).
302. TEX. R. App. P. 83. Rule 83 specifically provides:
A judgment shall not be affirmed or reversed or an appeal dismissed for
defects or irregularities, in appellate procedure, either of form or substance,
without allowing a reasonable time to correct or amend such defects or irregularities provided the court may make no enlargement of the time for filing
the transcript and statement of facts except pursuant to paragraph (c) of
Rule 54 ....
TEX. R. App. P. 83.
303. 903 S.W.2d 884 (Tex. App.-Houston [ist Dist.] 1995, no writ).
304. Id. at 886.
305. Id.
306. 881 S.W.2d 279 (Tex. 1994).
307. 903 S.W.2d at 887.
308. Id. at 886-87.
309. 896 S.W.2d 167 (Tex. 1995). Under the Administrative Procedure Act, before
seeking review of a final order in an administrative proceeding, the litigant must file a
motion for rehearing with the agency. TEX. Gov'T CODE ANN. § 2001.145 (Vernon 1995).
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upheld the district's decision. The Commissioner's decision was mailed to
the principal on September 21, 1990. The principal filed his motion for
rehearing on October 17, 1990, which was more than twenty days after
the notice was mailed but within twenty days of the date he actually received notice. The motion was overruled and the principal appealed to
the district court.
In the district court, the school district challenged the court's jurisdiction, claiming that the principal had not filed his motion for rehearing on
time. The court rejected the school district's contention and affirmed the
Commissioner's decision. The Austin Court of Appeals agreed that the
district 'court had jurisdiction and the supreme court affirmed the court of
3 10
appeals.
As the supreme court noted, the failure to file a timely motion for rehearing deprives the district court of jurisdiction to review the agency's
decision on appeal. 311 Under section 16(e) of the Administrative Procedure and Texas Register Act (APTRA), a motion for rehearing "must be
filed by a party within twenty days after the date the party or his attorney
of record is notified of the final decision or order as required by Subsection (b) of this section. ' 312 Under section 16(b) of the APTRA, a party
is
or attorney of record notified by mail of the agency's final decision
3 13
presumed to have been notified on the date the notice is mailed.
The school district argued that the presumption is rebuttable if a party
fails to receive any notice within twenty days of the date of mailing, but
irrebuttable if the notice is received within twenty days after it was
mailed, making the motion for rehearing due within twenty days from the
date notice was mailed. 314 The supreme court rejected the school district's argument, holding that the presumption disappears regardless of
when notice is actually received when evidence to the contrary of the
presumption is introduced. 31 5 A party, therefore, may rebut the presumption that he was notified on the date of mailing by offering evidence
that he actually received notice of the decision at a later date. 316 The
holding that the motion for rehearing
court affirmed the lower court's
317
was filed in a timely manner.
The issue in The City of Lubbock v. Elkins3 18 was whether the ten-day
window for appealing to the Civil Service Commission of the City of Lubforce was a ten
bock from an indefinite suspension from the City's police
3 19
calendar days window or a ten working days window.
310.
311.
312.
313.
314.
315.
316.
317.
318.
319.

Temple Indep. Sch. Dist., 896 S.W.2d at 167.
Id. at 169.
See TEx. Gov'r CODE ANN. § 2001.146(a) (Vernon 1995) (emphasis added).
Id. § 2001.0142(c).
Temple Indep. Sch. Dist., 896 S.W.2d at 169.
Id
Id
Id.
896 S.W.2d 346 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1995, no writ).
Id. at 347.
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Under the Texas Local Government Code, a party wishing to appeal
from an indefinite suspension is required to file a written appeal with the
Commission "within ten days after the date the person receives the copy
of the [suspension order]." 320 The suspended police officer in Elkins did
not file his written appeal within ten calendar days of receiving the suspension order, although he did file it within ten working days. The Commission determined that it had no jurisdiction to hear the officer's appeal
and dismissed the appeal because of its untimeliness.
The officer filed a lawsuit against the Commission seeking an order
from the trial court determining that the Commission had jurisdiction to
consider the merits of his appeal. The trial court determined that the
officer timely filed his appeal. The Amarillo Court of Appeals reversed
the trial court's finding,
holding that the term "days" in the statute means
' 32 1
"calendar days."

The appellate court noted that, under the Govern-

ment Code, the notice of suspension is given to the suspended officer
immediately upon suspension and identifies the precise civil service rules
alleged to have been violated by the officer.322 This information eliminates the need for an intensive fact finding investigation. 323 Further,
although the "notice" of appeal is due within ten days, the actual hearing
on the matter is not held until a later date, either within thirty days or on
a date agreed upon by the suspended officer. 324 The court concluded that
the Commission had no jurisdiction to consider the officer's appeal. 325
In Hamamcy v. Texas State Board of Medical Examiners,326 a doctor

appealed the Texas Board of Medical Examiner's decision to revoke his
license to practice medicine. The Austin Court of Appeals noted that a
motion for rehearing with the agency "must sufficiently notify the agency
of the error claimed so that the agency can either correct or defend the
error. '327 The motion must specifically set forth the fact finding or legal
conclusion or ruling complained of for each contention of error. 328
Seeking judicial review of the Board's decision to revoke, the appellant
in Hamamcy filed a document, which, although labeled "Motion for Rehearing," stated in its entirety that "the presentation of the discussion at
the hearing will be done from the charts of the patients and from the
records on file with the Board." 329 The Austin Court of Appeals held
that, although the specificity of a motion for rehearing is not jurisdic320. TEX. Loc. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 143.052(d) (Vernon 1995).
321. Elkins, 896 S.W.2d at 347. Amazingly, however, the court decided the time period

began at the precise moment the police officer received his notice: 10:40 a.m., allowing
until 10:40 a.m. ten days later to file an appeal. This decision flies in the face of the
supreme court's warning about deciding appeals on technicalities.
322. Id
323. Id.
324. Id
325. Id.
326. 900 S.W.2d 423 (Tex. App.-Austin 1995, no writ).
327. Id.
328. Id.
329. Id. at 425.
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tional in nature, "a motion for rehearing can be so indefinite, vague and
general" that it does not constitute a motion for rehearing. 330 The court
affirmed the trial court's dismissal of the case for lack of jurisdiction,
appellant was not sufficient to confer
holding that the motion filed by the
33 1
jurisdiction on the district court.
In a similar administrative appeal, the Austin Court of Appeals in Dolenz v. Texas State Board of Medical Examiners332 addressed the sufficiency of a doctor's motion for rehearing to the Texas Board of Medical
Examiners upon suspension of his medical license. The court in Dolenz
held that a motion for rehearing under the Administrative Procedure Act
must set out two requirements pertaining to each contention by the appellant: (1) the particular ruling or action of the agency that the movant
asserts is erroneous and (2) the legal basis upon which the claim of error
rests. 333 The Board asserted that the doctor's motion for rehearing did
not satisfy these requirements, rendering the trial court without jurisdiction to review the Board's decision. 334 The trial court agreed with the
Board and dismissed the doctor's appeal for want of jurisdiction. Reversing the lower court, the Austin Court of Appeals reviewed the motion for
that it was not so general as to fail completely
rehearing and determined 335
rehearing.
for
as a motion
In another administrative appeal, Simmons v. Texas State Board of
Dental Examiners,336 a dentist attempted to appeal an order of the Texas
State Board of Dental Examiners revoking his dental license. The dentist
initiated judicial review, however, by filing a petition in state district court
while his motion for rehearing to the Board was still pending. The dentist
was given notice of the Board's revocation of his license on September
20, 1993. On that same date, the dentist filed a motion for rehearing with
the Board. On September 30, 1995, while the motion for rehearing was
still pending, the dentist filed his petition in state court.
Realizing the prematurity of his state court lawsuit, the dentist filed a
motion to stay proceedings in the district court on October 14, 1993,
which was granted on October 18, 1993. On November 4, 1993, the motion for rehearing was overruled by operation of law. The dentist did not
refile the suit for judicial review within thirty days of this ruling. The
of the district court and the court disBoard challenged the jurisdiction
337
missed the dentist's appeal.
The Tyler Court of Appeals noted that an appeal from an administrative agency "is not a matter of right" and due process does not even re330. Id.
331. Hamamcy, 900 S.W.2d at 425.
332. 899 S.W.2d 809 (Tex. App.-Austin 1995, no writ).
333. Id. at 811; see TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 2001.145(a) (Vernon 1995).
334. Dolenz, 899 S.W.2d at 811.
335. Id. at 812. The court suggested but did not sua sponte review the issue of the
untimeliness of the motion. Id. at 810.
336. No. 12-94-00174-CV, 1995 WL 510598 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1995, writ requested).
337. Id. at *1.
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quire such review. 33 8 The Administrative Procedure Act, the court
determined, governs the procedure necessary to perfect an appeal from
an administrative agency such as the Board to the courts and requires
that the motion for rehearing be first overruled before the agency order
becomes an appealable final order. 339 The court held that the requirement of having a motion for rehearing overruled, thus exhausting administrative remedies, "is a jurisdictional prerequisite to judicial review by
the district court and cannot be waived by action of the parties. ' 340 In
this case, the court of appeals concluded, November 4, 1993, the date on
which the dentist's motion for rehearing was overruled, was the date on
which the decision became final and appealable. 341 Because the dentist
did not file his petition within thirty days after the date on which the
decision became final, the district court did not obtain jurisdiction over
the case and properly dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction. 342
Finally, the supreme court held in Board of DisciplinaryAppeals v. McFall343 that an attorney may only seek appeal to the Texas Supreme Court
from an adverse ruling by State Board of Disciplinary Appeals (the
"Board"), and may not seek relief from or enjoin the Board's ruling to
state district court while the appeal is pending. 344 In McFall, the Board
suspended an attorney from the practice of law. The attorney filed a notice of appeal with the Texas Supreme Court but did not request a stay of
his suspension. Instead, the day after he filed his appeal, the attorney
petitioned for a temporary restraining order from a state district court in
Lubbock, Texas. The Lubbock trial court granted a temporary restraining order and scheduled a hearing on a temporary injunction. The
Board petitioned the supreme court for a writ of mandamus and a writ of
prohibition.
The supreme court granted the writs, holding that under the disciplinary rules, an attorney may only appeal from a Board order directly to
the supreme court.34 5 If the appeal is unsuccessful, only then can the
attorney seek reinstatement in district court, with a jury trial if he desires
one. 34 6 Until conclusion of the appeal, however, the trial court lacks ju7
risdiction to provide interim equitable relief. 34
338. Id. at *2.
339. Id. at *2-3; see TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 2001.001 et seq. (Vernon Supp. 1995).
340. Simmons, 1995 WL 510598 at *2-3.
341. Id.; see TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 2001.144(a)(2)(B). Section 2001.144(a)(2)(b) of

the Administrative Procedure Act specifically states that: (a) A decision in a contested case

is final ...(2) if a motion for rehearing is filed on time, on the date ...(b) the motion is
overruled by operation of law. TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 2001.144(a)(2)(B).
342. Simmons, 1995 WL 510598 at *3; see TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 2001.176(a)

(Vernon 1995). On appeal from district court to the court of appeals, Rule 306C of the
Texas Rules of Civil Procedure would have applied to make the appeal timely.
343. 888 S.W.2d 471 (Tex. 1994) (orig. proceeding).
344. Id. at 472.
345. Id.; see TEX. R. DISCIPLINARY P. 7.11. (Vernon 1995).
346. McFall, 888 S.W.2d at 471-72; see TEX. R. DISCIPLINARY P. 12.06 (Vernon 1995).
347. Id.
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693

PROPOSED CHANGES TO THE TEXAS RULES OF
APPELLATE PROCEDURE

The Texas Supreme Court has been reviewing proposed changes to the
Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure submitted by the Supreme Court
Advisory Committee in March, 1995. 348 By the time this Article is published, the rules may have been approved. Readers are encouraged to
determine the status of the rule changes.
The goal of the proposed amendments is to simplify. In many instances, they follow the federal system. For example, they allow the filing
of a notice of appeal, rather than a cost bond, to perfect the appeal. The
amendments place the burden of assuring a complete record on the court
rather than counsel, once appeal has been perfected and the record designated, and they provide for the simpler "statement of issues" used in federal appellate practice rather than the draconian "points of error" now
349
used in state appellate practice.

348. See Supreme Court Advisory Committee Proposed Amendments to Texas Rules
of Appellate Procedure, March 21, 1995.
349. Where relevant, the proposed rule changes have been discussed in the preceding
sections.

